

# MIDDLE EAST PUBLIC OPINION



2018



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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between August 22 and September 17, 2018, Zogby Research Services conducted face-to-face polls, surveying 8,628 adults in eight Arab countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), Turkey, and Iran. We had been commissioned by the Sir Bani Yas Forum to explore attitudes toward a range of issues including their overall priorities; satisfaction with and confidence in their country's institutions; views of other countries; the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the Iran nuclear deal; and extremism. We also surveyed Palestinians and Iranians about developments within their countries. What follows is a summary of the most significant findings followed by a complete description of the results.

## 1. Priority Concerns

**Expanding employment opportunities is still the top priority among respondents in eight of the 10 countries.**

“Improving the educational system” and “political or governmental reform” are top-tier priorities in seven of the 10 countries.

“Political or governmental reform” has gained in importance in Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran, as has “ending corruption and nepotism” in Egypt and Tunisia.

## 2. Importance of Palestine, Syria, and Iranian Interference

All of these issues are seen as important, but **“ending the occupation of Palestinian lands” is rated the number one issue in most countries.**

## 3. & 4. Right/Wrong Track and Confidence in Institutions

There is a direct connection between whether respondents feel that their countries are moving in the right or wrong direction and their confidence in their institutions. **Tunisians, Egyptians, and Iraqis have very negative views about the direction of their countries and their institutions.**

Emirati and Turkish respondents, on the other hand, are very positive about both direction and their institutions. While Saudi right/wrong track numbers are mid-range positive, the confidence Saudis have in their institutions are among the highest across the region.

## 5. Sources of Information About the World

While “talking with family and friends” and television (both satellite and local) are still major sources of news and trusted sources, the media landscape has also changed, with a significant percentage of respondents now getting their information from the Internet and social media. These sources are also trusted for the information they convey.

## 6. Views of Other Countries

The European Union and China consistently receive the highest favorability ratings across the region. Turkey and Saudi Arabia also score well in most countries.

The United States only receives positive scores in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where the U.S. ratings have climbed dramatically. It is important to note that the United States only receives single digit favorable ratings in Iraq and Egypt.

Iran is only viewed favorably by a slight majority in Lebanon and Iraq. Elsewhere, its ratings are extremely low.

It is worth noting that in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq there is a sectarian divide with regard to attitudes toward Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. This same divide can also be observed in attitudes toward the roles these same countries are seen to play in Syria and Iraq.

## 7. Syria

**The roles played by Iran and Russia in Syria are viewed negatively by respondents in most countries.** Turkey's role in Syria is viewed positively by respondents in more than half of the countries surveyed.

A majority of respondents are only somewhat hopeful that the conflict in Syria is moving toward a resolution, but majorities or pluralities in most countries desire an outcome without Assad in power. These anti-Assad views have softened somewhat in most countries—most significantly in Jordan, the UAE, and Turkey.

## 8. Iraq

**With few exceptions, respondents say that most countries have played a negative role in Iraq, with the lion's share of fault going to the United States and Iran.**

Iraqis, while only slightly favorable to the role of the Popular Mobilization Units, are evenly divided on the roles played by Iran and their own military.

Iraqis, who in last year's poll were evenly divided on the U.S. role in their country, now overwhelmingly express the view that the U.S. involvement has been negative.

In the vast majority of countries, respondents favor a reformed and representative government in Baghdad that can keep the country unified.

It is noteworthy that a majority of Iraqis now support a reformed government that can keep the county unified. This view is shared by Iraqi Shia and Kurds. Only Iraqi Sunni Arabs now support a federation of autonomous regions.

This support for a unified Iraq represents a significant shift since last year when Iraqis were divided between this option and one that called for a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the government in Baghdad.



## 9. Palestine

**In most countries a majority of respondents are opposed to Arab states partnering with Israel to combat extremism and Iran's interference.** Even if Israel were to fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative most respondents would still be opposed to such a partnership.

In 2017, Palestinian respondents were almost evenly divided in their opinion as to whether there should be a one-state solution with equal rights for both Israelis and Palestinians and the contrary view that no solution was possible to resolve the conflict. Now in 2018, **fully one half of all Palestinians feel no solution is possible**, with the remaining half evenly divided between support for two states and one state as the way to end the conflict.

## 10. Yemen

**In every country, a plurality of respondents say that their most important concern with regard to the conflict in Yemen is the humanitarian crisis.** In 2017, that issue did not rise to the top of the list of the concerns in any country.

In five of the nine countries surveyed, either a decisive majority or a plurality of respondents favor “negotiations leading to compromise among warring parties and establishment of a central government representing all factions” as the best way to end the conflict. In the other four countries, respondents favor “the restoration of the legitimate government.” In no country do respondents favor a partition of the country.

## 11A. Iran's Nuclear Program

While opinion in all 10 countries is nearly evenly divided on initial support for the P5+1 agreement, only in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey do a majority feel that the agreement has been successful in limiting Iran's capacity to produce a weapon.

**In every country, other than Egypt, majorities are supportive of the Trump Administration's decision to pull out of the nuclear deal with Iran.**

With the U.S. pull-out from the P5+1 agreement, opinion is divided as to what the remaining members of the agreement should do. **There is consensus, however, on one issue: that in any new agreement there must be “a verifiable Iranian commitment to end support for and withdraw its troops and allies from conflicts in Arab countries.”**

In every country but Tunisia and the UAE majorities support calling on Iran to “participate in a regional security arrangement with Arab countries to help bring peace to the region.”

Opinion is divided as to whether it possible for Iran and the Arab World to live in peace. In no case does a majority say it is “very possible” with a decisive majority of Tunisians and Egyptians saying “it is not possible at all.”

On the other side, only 8% of Iranians hold the view that “it is not possible” to live in peace with the Arab World, with one-half claiming that it is “very possible.”

## 11B. Iranian views

A slight majority of Iranians supported the P5+1 agreement and express the belief that it was in their country's interests. Nevertheless, **a substantial 84% of Iranians still hold the view that their country should have the right to a nuclear weapon.**

In almost every area (improving the economy, advancing democracy and protecting rights, giving support to allies in conflicts in Arab countries, and improving relations with the West and Arab governments) there is about a 10-point drop in Iranians' satisfaction with their government's performance.

Similarly, there is **a decline in Iranians' views of the importance of their government's continued involvement in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.**

## 12. Extremism

Majorities in every country except Tunisia and Palestine believe that radicalized individuals can be successfully de-radicalized, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE expressing the greatest confidence that this can be done. Less than one-quarter of Tunisians think de-radicalization is possible and only slightly more than one quarter believe that their country is prepared to deal with the return of radicalized individuals. In every other country polled, opinion is nearly evenly divided as to whether their country is prepared to handle the return of radicalized individuals.

# 1. PRIORITIES

We asked respondents to select and rank the three issues they see as most important from the following list:

- Expanding employment opportunities
- Advancing democracy
- Protecting personal and civil rights
- Ending corruption and nepotism
- Political or governmental reform
- Improving the health care system
- Improving the educational system
- Combating the threat posed by extremist groups and terrorism
- Increasing rights for women
- Protecting the country from foreign enemies

**Table 1. Of the following list of issues facing your country, which are the three most important issues that need to be addressed? Rank them from 1 (being the most important issue) through 3.**

RANK	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
1	Employment (1)	End corruption (4)	Employment (1)	Employment	Employment (1)	Employment (1)	Employment (1)	Personal rights (1)	Employment	Employment (1)
2	Education (8)	Education (2)	Health care (7)	Political reform	Women's rights (9)	Political reform (6)	Education (8)	Education (6)	Education	Women's rights (6)
3	Extremist groups (3)	Political reform (6)	Women's rights (9)	End corruption	Political reform (3)	Health care (5)	Extremist groups (7)	Foreign enemies*	Democracy	Political reform (4)
4	Political reform (5)	Employment (1)	Extremist groups (8)	Health care	Personal rights (7)	Personal rights (7)	Political reform (5)	Employment (3)	Women's rights	Health care (8)
5	End corruption (7)	Health care (3)	End corruption (2)	Education	Education (8)	End corruption (3)	End corruption (2)	Democracy (5)	Extremist groups	Personal rights (3)
6	Health care (6)	Personal rights (7)	Personal rights (4)	Personal rights	Health care (5)	Women's rights (9)	Personal rights (4)	Extremist groups (9)	Foreign enemies*	Democracy (2)
7	Personal rights (9)	Extremist groups (5)	Foreign enemies*	Women's rights	End corruption (2)	Education (4)	Foreign enemies*	Political reform (7)	Political reform	End corruption (5)
8	Women's rights (4)	Democracy (8)	Political reform (3)	Foreign enemies*	Democracy (6)	Extremist groups (2)	Democracy (3)	Health care (2)	Personal rights	Education (7)
9	Foreign enemies*	Foreign enemies*	Democracy (5)	Democracy	Extremist groups (4)	Democracy (8)	Health care (6)	End corruption (8)	End corruption	Extremist groups (9)
10	Democracy (2)	Women's rights (9)	Education (6)	Extremist groups	Foreign enemies*	Foreign enemies*	Women's rights (9)	Women's rights (4)	Health care	Foreign enemies*

For countries where we asked this same question in 2011 (all except Palestine and Turkey), the rank order of the issue in 2011 is included in parentheses.

\*"Protecting the country from foreign enemies" is a new choice in the 2018 survey.

Overall, “expanding employment opportunities” is the number one issue on this list that respondents want their countries to prioritize. It is considered most important in eight of the 10 countries surveyed, all except Egypt, where respondents rank “ending corruption and nepotism” first, and the UAE, where “protecting personal and civil rights” tops the list. In both Egypt and the UAE, however, employment is still a top tier (4th) issue of importance.

## **Expanding employment opportunities is still the top priority among respondents in eight of the 10 countries.**

“Improving the educational system” is the second most important issue overall, and is ranked second in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey. This issue is of the least concern in Iraq (7th), Iran (8th), and Lebanon (10th).

“Political and governmental reform” is the third most identified issue of importance overall and is a top-tier priority in Palestine (2nd), Iraq (2nd), Jordan (3rd), Iran (3rd),

Egypt (3rd), Tunisia (4th), and Saudi Arabia (4th).

“Combating the threat posed by extremist groups and terrorism” and “ending corruption and nepotism” are the remaining two issues that are ranked in the top tier of priorities overall. Combating extremism and terrorism are of particular importance in Tunisia (3rd), Saudi Arabia (3rd), and Lebanon (4th), but of the least importance to respondents in Palestine (10th), Jordan (9th), Iraq (8th), and Iran (9th). In addition to Egypt where it is the number one issue of importance, ending corruption is also a top-tier priority in Palestine (3rd), Saudi Arabia (5th), Iraq (5th), Tunisia (5th), and Lebanon (5th).

“Protecting personal and civil rights” is considered important by respondents in the UAE (1st), Jordan (4th), and Iraq (4th). “Improving the health care system” is in the top tier of issues in Lebanon (2nd), Iraq (3rd), Palestine (4th), Iran (4th), and Egypt (5th). “Increasing rights for women” is second in Jordan and Iran, third in Lebanon, and fourth in Turkey. “Advancing democracy” and “protecting the country from foreign enemies” are each represented only once among the top tier of issues in the 10 countries: “democracy” is third in Turkey and “foreign enemies” is third in the UAE.

When comparing these results to the last time we asked this question in 2011, we find some aspects of stability and other issues of growing importance. Employment was also the number one ranked issue overall in 2011, and the concern with issues related to governance and rights that we noted as emerging in 2011 continues to be evident in this year’s survey. Political and governmental reform, ending corruption and nepotism, and protecting personal and civil rights are among the most important issues in many countries. Political reform has advanced as an issue of concern in Tunisia, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Ending corruption has climbed the ranks in Tunisia as well as in Egypt (to first place). And the protection of civil rights has risen as an issue of importance in Jordan and Iraq.

Of particular note in the current survey is the growing importance of improving the educational systems in Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, and the health care systems in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. In addition, we find a steep ascent in the importance of increasing rights for women among respondents in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iran, where this issue now ranks as the second or third most important issue, rising from the bottom tier of priorities in 2011.

## 2. IMPORTANCE OF PALESTINE, SYRIA, AND IRAN

**Table 2. On a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the least important and 10 being the most important, how important are each of the following issues facing your country?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Ending the occupation of Palestinian lands and resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict	9.45	9.15	6.36	8.82	5.81	6.37	8.82	8.65	8.81
Resolving the conflict in Syria	8.26	9.20	6.45	7.87	5.83	5.82	7.87	8.19	8.01
The danger posed by Iranian interference in the region	6.63	8.76	5.91	8.27	6.31	4.50	8.27	8.44	7.89

Values shown are the mean of all ratings given by respondents in each country.

**Table 3. Rank of Importance: Ending occupation in Palestine | Resolving conflict in Syria | Danger of Iranian interference**

RANK	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
1	Palestine	Syria	Syria	Palestine	Iran	Palestine	Palestine	Palestine	Palestine
2	Syria	Palestine	Palestine	Iran	Syria	Syria	Iran	Iran	Syria
3	Iran	Iran	Iran	Syria	Palestine	Iran	Syria	Syria	Iran

“Ending the occupation of Palestinian lands and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” is viewed as the most important issue of the three provided in six of the nine countries surveyed, including Tunisia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Palestine itself. In each of these countries the issue’s mean score tops 8.6 on a scale of 1 to 10; overall, it is the highest rated concern, with an average score of 8.03.

“Resolving the conflict in Syria” edges out the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Egypt and Lebanon as the most important issue. And the Syrian conflict is ranked second in importance by respondents in Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey. Its average importance rating out of 10 is 7.5.

Finally, “the danger posed by Iranian interference in the region” is considered the most important issue by respondents in Jordan, and has the second highest mean score in Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Overall, its average rating of importance is 7.22 out of 10.

**“Ending the occupation of Palestinian lands” is rated the number one issue in most countries.**

### 3. RIGHT OR WRONG TRACK

**Table 4. Do you feel that your country is on the right track or the wrong track?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Right track	20	19	47	14	34	22	49	80	84	40
Wrong track	69	55	30	65	38	52	36	10	0	28
Not sure	11	26	24	21	28	27	15	10	16	32

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

In two of the 10 surveyed countries, the UAE and Turkey, at least eight in 10 respondents are quite optimistic, saying that their country is “on the right track” (80% and 84%, respectively). Pluralities in Saudi Arabia (49%), Lebanon (47%), and Iran (40%) also view their countries as on the right track, while Jordanians are split on whether their country is on the right track or moving in the wrong direction (34% vs. 38%). In the remaining four countries, majorities say their countries are on the wrong track, including 69% in Tunisia, 65% in Palestine, 55% in Egypt, and 52% in Iraq.

**Table 5. Overall, do you think you are better off or worse off than you were five years ago?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Better off	21	20	32	17	31	20	36	68	72	34
Worse off	59	64	39	49	39	55	29	6	2	33
About the same	20	16	28	33	30	25	36	25	27	33

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

To measure satisfaction, we ask respondents if they feel they are better off, worse off, or about the same now as compared to five years ago. Only in the UAE (68%) and Turkey (72%) do majorities say they are better off; in each of these two countries, about one-quarter say their situation is about the same and very small numbers say they are worse off (6% and 2%, respectively).

### Tunisians, Egyptians, and Iraqis have very negative views about the direction of their countries and institutions.

On the other hand, majorities in Egypt (64%), Tunisia (59%), and Iraq (55%), and almost one-half in Palestine (49%) say they are worse off now than they were five years ago, with about two in 10 respondents in each country saying they are better off. In Iraq we find that Sunni respondents are three times more likely than their Shia compatriots to say they are worse off (96% vs. 33%). Of the remaining Iraqi Sunnis, 3% say they are better off and 1% say they are about the same, while 29% of Iraqi Shia say they are better off and 38% say they are about the same. In Palestine, those who live in Gaza are most likely to say they are worse

off (79% vs. 36% in the West Bank and 13% in Jerusalem), while Jerusalemites are the group most likely to say they are better off (42% vs. 7% in Gaza and 19% in the West Bank).

In the remaining four countries, respondents are quite divided, with about one-third in each saying they are better off (Lebanon: 32%, Jordan: 31%, Saudi Arabia: 36%, and Iran: 34%), while about one-third say they are worse off (Lebanon: 39%, Jordan: 39%, Saudi Arabia: 29%, and Iran: 33%) and one-third say they are about the same.

In most countries we find a significant overlap between those who say their country is on the right track and those who say they are personally better off now than they were five years ago, and likewise between those who think their country is on the wrong track and who say they are worse off now than five years ago. This pattern is particularly evident in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, where among those who say their country is on the wrong track, fewer than one in 10 respondents identify themselves as better off than five years ago and vice versa. The same basic pattern is found in Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran. While perhaps somewhat obvious, this serves as a reminder that the personal well-being of individuals (however they choose to define that) translates quite directly to their overall sense of satisfaction with their country’s direction.

**Emirati and Turkish respondents are very positive about the direction of their countries and institutions.**

**Table 6. Overall, do you think you are better off or worse off than you were five years ago? (by right track/wrong track response)**

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN	
	Right Track	Wrong Track	Right Track	Wrong Track	Right Track	Wrong Track	Right Track	Wrong Track	Right Track	Wrong Track
Better off	88	4	70	5	37	32	61	9	62	0
Worse off	0	81	9	83	35	42	25	63	20	60
About the same	12	15	21	12	28	26	14	28	18	40

	IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY		IRAN	
	Right Track	Wrong Track	Right Track	Wrong Track	Right Track	Wrong Track	Right Track	Wrong Track	Right Track	Wrong Track
Better off	26	18	57	8	84	0	80	26	53	19
Worse off	39	60	0	58	2	45	1	6	17	42
About the same	35	22	43	34	14	55	19	68	31	38


Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

## 4. CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

**Table 7. How much confidence do you have in the performance of each of the following institutions operating in your country?**

		TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Military	Confident	33	41	60	68	64	20	90	97	98	64
	Not confident	67	59	40	32	36	80	10	3	2	36
Police	Confident	26	37	64	72	63	19	87	96	81	58
	Not confident	74	63	36	28	37	81	13	3	19	42
Judiciary	Confident	41	39	66	69	62	20	89	96	93	66
	Not confident	59	61	34	31	38	80	11	4	7	34
Religious Establishment	Confident	15	50	69	73	64	28	94	96	99	63
	Not confident	85	50	31	27	36	72	6	4	1	37
Media	Confident	10	28	54	64	37	23	80	80	54	57
	Not confident	90	72	46	36	63	77	20	20	46	43
Parliament	Confident	25	27	48	53	47	6	79	89	45	56
	Not confident	75	73	52	47	53	94	21	11	55	44

Confident is the aggregation of responses of "a lot of confidence" and "some confidence." Not confident is the aggregation of responses of "little confidence" and "no confidence."





Overall, in seven of the 10 countries surveyed (all except Tunisia, Egypt, and Iraq) there is considerable confidence in most of the institutions operating in their countries, with the highest levels of confidence expressed with respect to the religious establishment, as well as the military, police, and judiciary, and lower levels of confidence in the media and parliament.

**Respondents in Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the highest levels of confidence in their institutions**, with at least eight in 10 respondents expressing confidence in every institution. In Iran and Palestine, majorities also express confidence in all institutions, albeit at a lower level than in Saudi Arabia and the UAE; closer to six in 10 respondents in these countries are confident in their institutions. In both Iran and Palestine confidence is slightly lower with respect to their parliaments (56% and 53%, respectively) and the media (57% and 64%, respectively) than other institutions. In Lebanon, again we find majorities confident in all institutions except parliament, about which opinion is split (48% vs. 52%). Jordanian respondents hold similar views to their Lebanese neighbors, though they have significantly less confidence in the media (37% vs. 63%).

In Turkey there are very high levels of confidence in the religious establishment (99%), military (98%), judiciary (93%), and police (81%), but respondents are somewhat split with respect to confidence in the media (54% vs. 46%) and parliament (45% vs. 55%).

**Majorities of respondents in Egypt, Tunisia, and Iraq say they do not have confidence in any of the institutions operating in their countries.** In Iraq only about one in five respondents express confidence in the military, police, judiciary, and the media. They have the highest level of confidence, still just 28%, in their religious establishment and the lowest level of confidence in the parliament (only 6%). Tunisian respondents express the highest levels of confidence in the judiciary (41%) and the military (33%), followed by one-quarter who are confident in parliament and the police; very few express confidence in the religious establishment (15%) or the media (10%).

In Egypt, the numbers are somewhat higher, with opinion evenly split with respect to the religious establishment (50% vs. 50%), and about four in 10 respondents saying they have confidence in the military (41%), the judiciary (39%), and the police (37%); just one-quarter express confidence in the media (28%) and their parliament (27%). It is worth noting that Egyptian respondents' confidence in the military has plummeted by more than 50 points since 2013. In the immediate aftermath of the deposing of President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, our polling found the level of confidence among Egyptians for their army was 93% and was consistent among secularists and Islamists alike. The current low level of confidence (41%) demonstrates a decline in this broad public support over the intervening five years.

In addition, Egyptians who say their country is on the right track are far more likely to express confidence in their country's institutions. This general trend is evident in a number of countries but nowhere is it as pronounced as it is in Egypt.

**Table 8. Egypt: Confidence in Institutions (by right track/wrong track)**

	RIGHT TRACK	WRONG TRACK
Military	68	29
Police	66	22
Judiciary	69	27
Religious establishment	75	38
Media	66	19
Parliament	75	10

## 5. SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE WORLD

**Table 9. What are the two main sources to which you turn for news about the world?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE
Satellite television networks from the Arab World	30	50	48	32	20	33	35	23
Satellite television networks from the West	11	5	35	15	8	6	19	16
National or local television networks	23	33	34	29	18	37	15	12
Newspapers	1	2	10	10	8	8	28	44
Internet news sites	31	25	10	33	35	20	31	38
Facebook, Twitter, other social media sites	69	39	14	48	29	24	35	31
WhatsApp	0	2	17	14	27	29	5	6
Talking with family and friends	35	43	32	18	55	43	33	30

Respondents in eight of the surveyed countries were asked about the two main sources that they turn to for news about the world. The top two choices overall are “talking with family and friends” and “Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites,” closely followed by “satellite television networks from the Arab World.”

Social media is ranked first among respondents in Tunisia (69%), Palestine (48%), and Saudi Arabia (35%). Family and friends are the top choice in Jordan (55%) and Iraq (43%), and the second-place choice in Egypt (43%) and Tunisia (35%). Satellite television is ranked first by respondents in Egypt (50%), Lebanon (48%), and Saudi Arabia (35%).

Internet news sites and national and local television networks are each identified as main sources for world news by an average of one-quarter of respondents.

Satellite television networks from the West, newspapers, and WhatsApp are the least identified world news sources in the poll, though there are a few exceptions. One-third of Lebanese respondents (35%) say they watch satellite news from the West and 44% of respondents in the UAE turn to newspapers as a source of world news (their top choice). More than one-quarter of respondents in Jordan and Iraq say WhatsApp is a significant source of world news for them.

It is interesting to compare these numbers to responses in 2011 when we first asked respondents across the region about the most important ways that they follow news and information—in that case, about the events in their own country and the Arab Spring. Considered in aggregate, satellite and local/national television were the top two choices in 2011 for following news about their countries, while satellite television networks and Internet news sites were the top choices for following events in the Arab World. Social media was near the bottom of the list for both domestic and regional news. Talking to friends and family was also far less significant in 2011. In some ways, these changes could be seen as a democratization of information – with peer-to-peer communication being increasingly privileged over more traditional news media.

One additional note of interest here is that unlike in our earlier polling, we no longer find differences based on age or any other demographic variable on choice of news source.

**Table 10. Using the same list, which are the two sources for news you trust to provide the most honest information about the world?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE
Satellite television networks from the Arab World	34	51	25	32	20	32	33	21
Satellite television networks from the West	15	5	22	16	8	7	26	13
National or local television networks	6	33	31	29	19	36	15	12
Newspapers	13	1	21	19	7	8	32	43
Internet news sites	49	26	18	34	33	20	31	38
Facebook, Twitter, other social media sites	51	38	22	40	29	23	29	24
WhatsApp	0	2	22	14	26	29	3	4
Talking with family and friends	31	43	38	15	58	44	31	45

When asked to identify the most trustworthy news sources, overall respondents are most likely to say “talking with family and friends,” followed by satellite television networks from the Arab World, Internet news sites, and Facebook, Twitter, and other social media sites. National or local television networks and newspapers represent the next tier of reliably honest news sources. At the bottom of the list overall, we find satellite television networks from the West and WhatsApp.

Family and friends are viewed as the top choice for honest information about the world in Jordan (58%), the UAE (45%), Iraq (44%), and Lebanon (38%). Arab satellite television is the top choice for respondents in Egypt (51%) and Saudi Arabia (33%) and social media is the top choice in Tunisia (51%) and Palestine (40%).

## 6. ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER COUNTRIES

**Table 11. For each of the following countries, please tell us if your attitudes are favorable or unfavorable.**

		TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY		IRAN	
		2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018
US	Favorable		30	38	8	52	48		16	35	37	6	8	28	86	28	78	21	15	12	32
	Unfavorable		70	62	92	48	52		84	65	63	94	92	72	14	69	22	79	85	87	68
Turkey	Favorable		81	33	57	56	61		81	79	58	30	60	35	26	41	38			35	61
	Unfavorable		19	67	43	44	39		19	21	42	70	40	65	74	59	62			64	39
KSA	Favorable		6	84	61	57	57		57	85	54	68	58			76	100	83	26	36	34
	Unfavorable		94	16	39	41	43		43	15	46	31	42			23	0	17	74	62	66
Iran	Favorable		5	6	3	49	58		42	18	20	39	58	9	15	29	11	9	45		
	Unfavorable		95	94	97	51	42		58	82	80	61	42	90	85	71	89	90	55		
Russia	Favorable		18	49	19	33	54		40	35	38	28	48	24	54	40	20	10	85	57	67
	Unfavorable		82	51	81	67	46		60	65	62	71	52	76	46	59	80	87	15	43	33
China	Favorable		49		40		58		51		55		50		76		65		73		58
	Unfavorable		51		60		42		49		45		50		24		35		27		42
EU	Favorable		72		26		58		55		56		42		88		76		67		55
	Unfavorable		28		74		42		45		44		58		12		24		33		45

Percentages may not add up to 100% because responses of "not sure" (an option ONLY in 2016) are not included. Tunisia and Palestine were not included in the 2016 survey.

The European Union and China earn the highest favorability ratings of the seven countries about which we polled. The EU is viewed favorably by majorities in eight of the 10 countries surveyed, all except Egypt (26%) and Iraq (42%); its highest ratings are from respondents in Saudi Arabia (88%), the UAE (76%), and Tunisia (72%). Majorities in six of the surveyed countries hold favorable opinions of China, including 76% in Saudi Arabia and 73% in Turkey; opinion is evenly divided in Tunisia, Palestine, and Iraq, while China's lowest favorable rating is found in Egypt (40%).

Majorities in seven of the nine surveyed countries hold favorable opinions of Turkey, with its highest ratings coming from Tunisia (81%) and Palestine (81%) and its lowest favorability in Saudi Arabia (26%) and the UAE (38%). Since 2016, overall ratings of Turkey have risen by eight points, with increases in Iraq (+30), Egypt (+24), and Iran (+26) and a significant decline in favorability among respondents in Jordan (-21).

**The European Union and China consistently receive the highest favorability ratings across the region, while Turkey and Saudi Arabia also score well.**

Saudi Arabia is viewed favorably by majorities in six countries, but while opinion is now universally positive in the UAE (up 24 points since 2016), ratings have fallen sharply in Turkey (-57), Jordan (-31), Egypt (-23), and Iraq (-10), adding up to a 14-point drop overall in average ratings since 2016.

**Both the United States and Iran only receive favorable ratings in two countries.**

Russia has seen a significant rise in its favorability since 2016, with an average favorability 13 points higher than the previous survey. Majorities in four countries hold positive views of the country including Turkey (85%, up 75 points), Iran (67%, up 10 points), Saudi Arabia (54%, up 30 points), and Lebanon (54%, up 21 points), as do almost one-half of respondents in Iraq (48%, up 20 points). On the other hand,

we find significant declines in Russia’s favorability ratings given by those in Egypt (-30) and the UAE (-20).

The United States and Iran remain at the bottom of the list, though the average favorability of both countries has risen since 2016, the United States by 13 points and Iran by seven. The United States receives favorable ratings by majorities only in Saudi Arabia (86%) and the UAE (78%), both of which have jumped by 50 points or more since 2016. There is also a significant increase in favorable opinions expressed by respondents in Iran (32%, up 20 points). Opinions have largely remained constant in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, while there have been significant declines in favorability among respondents in Egypt (-30 to 8%) and Turkey (-6 to 15%).

Only majorities in Lebanon (58%) and Iraq (58%) now view Iran favorably, with increases of nine and 19 points, respectively, since 2016. We also find a significant increase in Turkey, up 36 points to a favorable rating of 45%. Palestinians also have a relatively positive view of Iran, with 42% saying they view the country favorably. The biggest decline in ratings of Iran comes from the UAE, where favorability dropped 18 points since the previous survey.

**Table 12. Favorability by Sect (2018)**

	LEBANON		IRAQ		KSA		UAE	
	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia	Sunni	Shia
Turkey	64	59	67	57	24	35	36	53
Saudi Arabia	60	52	70	52			100	100
Iran	52	67	15	81	5	76	6	56
Russia	44	67	41	52	51	71	21	16

There are some differences of opinion between Sunni and Shia populations in Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE with respect to their favorability ratings of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia. With only a couple of exceptions Shia respondents have more favorable views of Iran and Russia than their Sunni compatriots, while Sunni respondents are more favorable of Turkey and Saudi Arabia than their Shia compatriots. In Lebanon, the pattern is clear as Sunni respondents rate Turkey and Saudi Arabia 5-8 points higher than Shia respondents, and more significantly Lebanese Shia rate

Iran and Russia more favorably by 15 and 23 points, respectively. Iraqi Sunnis rate Turkey and Saudi Arabia more favorably by 10–18 points, while the reverse is true with respect to Shia's higher opinion of Russia. More pronounced is that Iraqi Shia view Iran very favorably (81%) compared to Iraqi Sunnis (15%).

We do not find a Sunni-Shia split in favorability with respect to Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the opinions of Saudi and Emirati respondents, perhaps due to the general disaffection for Turkey in Saudi Arabia and the UAE and the unanimity of favorability in the UAE for Saudi Arabia. However, the Sunni-Shia divide in both Saudi Arabia and the UAE regarding Iran is noteworthy. Among Shia, 76% in Saudi Arabia and 56% in the UAE hold favorable views of Iran, while just 5-6% of Sunni respondents in Saudi Arabia and the UAE agree.

## 7. SYRIA

**Table 13. With regard to the conflict in Syria, of the list below, which countries do you believe are playing a positive role? a negative role?**

	TUNISIA			EGYPT			LEBANON			PALESTINE		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
US	29	58	<b>-29</b>	4	91	<b>-87</b>	35	56	<b>-21</b>	7	53	<b>-46</b>
Russia	15	77	<b>-62</b>	9	76	<b>-67</b>	23	70	<b>-47</b>	18	45	<b>-27</b>
Iran	4	93	<b>-89</b>	2	96	<b>-94</b>	16	55	<b>-39</b>	16	30	<b>-14</b>
Turkey	67	18	<b>+49</b>	58	28	<b>+30</b>	71	20	<b>+51</b>	29	13	<b>+16</b>
KSA	10	84	<b>-74</b>	59	27	<b>+32</b>	38	43	<b>-5</b>	16	17	<b>-1</b>
None	19	1	<b>+18</b>	12	0	<b>+12</b>	11	0	<b>+11</b>	37	14	<b>+23</b>

	JORDAN			IRAQ			KSA			UAE		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
US	23	33	<b>-10</b>	8	47	<b>-39</b>	56	22	<b>+34</b>	58	29	<b>+29</b>
Russia	11	53	<b>-42</b>	20	42	<b>-22</b>	27	46	<b>-19</b>	24	76	<b>-52</b>
Iran	14	52	<b>-38</b>	28	35	<b>-7</b>	14	85	<b>-71</b>	12	82	<b>-70</b>
Turkey	49	19	<b>+30</b>	24	28	<b>-4</b>	44	47	<b>-3</b>	34	55	<b>-21</b>
KSA	40	23	<b>+17</b>	28	40	<b>-12</b>	64	28	<b>+36</b>	90	5	<b>+85</b>
None	9	0	<b>+9</b>	28	0	<b>+28</b>	13	0	<b>+13</b>	4	2	<b>+2</b>

	TURKEY			IRAN		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
US	11	82	<b>-71</b>	11	45	<b>-34</b>
Russia	51	31	<b>+20</b>	35	31	<b>+4</b>
Iran	26	58	<b>-32</b>	52	12	<b>+40</b>
Turkey	79	13	<b>+66</b>	32	27	<b>+5</b>
KSA	26	61	<b>-35</b>	11	52	<b>-41</b>
None	5	0	<b>+5</b>	10	0	<b>+10</b>

Respondents were asked if the United States, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia play positive or negative roles in the conflict in Syria.

**Turkey is the country most likely to be seen as playing a positive role with regard to the conflict in Syria.** Majorities in Turkey itself (79%), Lebanon (71%), Tunisia (67%), and Egypt (58%) view Turkey's role as positive, and more respondents say its role is positive than say it is negative in Jordan (49% vs. 19%), Palestine (29% vs. 13%), and Iran (32% vs. 27%). Opinion is split in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, while respondents in the UAE are more likely to view Turkey's role as negative (34% positive vs. 55% negative).



Saudi Arabia is seen as a positive force in the Syrian conflict by majorities in Saudi Arabia itself (64%), the UAE (90%), and Egypt (59%) and by a plurality of respondents in Jordan (40% positive vs. 23% negative). On the other hand, the Saudi role in Syria is seen as negative by majorities in Tunisia (84%), Turkey (61%), and Iran (52%), and on balance negatively in Lebanon (38% positive vs. 45% negative) and Iraq (28% positive vs. 40% negative).

**The roles played by Iran and Russia in Syria are viewed negatively by respondents in most countries.**

**The United States, Russia, and Iran are seen as playing a predominantly negative role in the Syrian conflict, with a few exceptions.** The U.S. role is viewed positively only by respondents in Saudi Arabia (56%) and the UAE (58%), with majorities in Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, and Turkey saying the United States plays a negative role in the Syrian conflict. There is similar sentiment with regard to Russia’s role in Syria, with respondents in Turkey (51%) saying it is positive, Iranians leaning toward the view that it is positive (35% vs. 31%), and respondents from the other eight surveyed countries clearly stating that Russia’s role in Syria is negative. Only Iranians themselves view their country’s role in Syria as positive (52%), while at least eight in 10 respondents in Tunisia (93%), Egypt (96%), Saudi Arabia (85%), and the UAE (82%), majorities in Turkey (58%), Lebanon (55%), and Jordan (52%), and on balance those in Palestine (16% positive vs. 30% negative) and Iraq (28% vs. 35%) view Iran’s role in Syria negatively.

**We also find deep sectarian divides among respondents in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE with respect to which countries play positive and negative roles in Syria.**

**Table 14. With regard to the conflict in Syria, of the list below, which countries do you believe are playing a positive role? A negative role? (by Sunni/Shia)**

	IRAQ						KSA						UAE					
	Sunni			Shia			Sunni			Shia			Sunni			Shia		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
US	12	52	<b>-40</b>	6	44	<b>-38</b>	53	22	<b>+31</b>	73	24	<b>+49</b>	57	30	<b>+27</b>	60	22	<b>+38</b>
Russia	1	54	<b>-53</b>	29	36	<b>-7</b>	18	53	<b>-35</b>	78	5	<b>+73</b>	24	76	<b>-52</b>	27	73	<b>-46</b>
Iran	2	57	<b>-55</b>	41	23	<b>+18</b>	<1	99	<b>-98</b>	91	3	<b>+88</b>	7	87	<b>-80</b>	56	44	<b>+12</b>
Turkey	65	20	<b>+45</b>	3	32	<b>-29</b>	51	39	<b>+12</b>	3	94	<b>-91</b>	34	55	<b>-21</b>	31	56	<b>-25</b>
KSA	67	11	<b>+56</b>	8	55	<b>-47</b>	69	21	<b>+48</b>	33	67	<b>-34</b>	90	5	<b>+85</b>	87	4	<b>+83</b>

While opinions about the United States are notably consistent between Sunni and Shia, with Iraqis viewing the U.S. role in Syria as negative and Saudis and Emiratis viewing the U.S. role on balance as positive, we find particularly significant differences by sect regarding the role of Iran in Syria. In Saudi Arabia, Sunni respondents are overwhelmingly negative about Iran’s role in Syria (-98), while their Shia compatriots are overwhelmingly positive (+88). Sunni respondents in Iraq and the UAE are also quite negative about Iran (-55 and -80, respectively), and Shia respondents are on balance positive (+18 and +12, respectively). **These positive ratings are somewhat tempered by the stable contingent**

of Shia respondents in Iraq and the UAE who hold negative views of Iran (in evidence elsewhere in this poll) – totaling about one-quarter of Shia in Iraq and about four in 10 Shia in the UAE.

In the UAE, opinions about the roles of Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are not divided by sect. However, in Iraq and Saudi Arabia Sunni respondents are more likely to view Turkey and Saudi Arabia as playing positive roles and Russia as playing a negative role.

**Table 15. How hopeful are you that developments in Syria are moving toward an end of that conflict?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Very hopeful	6	4	28	10	22	34	32	45	26	36
Somewhat hopeful	37	45	45	45	45	44	45	41	34	37
Not hopeful at all	57	51	27	45	33	22	23	13	40	27

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Majorities in Tunisia (57%) and Egypt (51%) are “not hopeful at all” that developments in Syria are moving toward an end to that conflict. But in all of the other surveyed countries, majorities are “very” or “somewhat hopeful.” About four in 10 respondents in all of the countries say they are somewhat hopeful. One-third or more respondents in Saudi Arabia (32%), Iraq (34%), Iran (36%), and the UAE (45%) are “very hopeful” about the prospects for an end to the Syrian conflict.

**Table 16. Which of the following outcomes do you feel represents the best future for Syria?**

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY		IRAN		
	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	2015	2018	
Negotiations leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar al Assad			73	88	78	36	33		38	58	29		26	74	64	97	54	90	24	15	15
Negotiations leading to a national unity government with the participation of Bashar al Assad			5	2	18	14	18		23	12	10		22	2	24	0	29	4	61	35	42
The establishment of a loose federation of regions			16	8	1	38	25		18	24	34		23	23	0	4	0	6	0	37	24
The partition of the country			1	2	0	12	12		7	6	20		21	1	0	0	0	0	0	13	6
A return to full power of the Assad Government*			5		3		13		14		7		8		12		16		15		14

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Tunisia and Palestine were not included in the 2015 survey. Iraqis were not asked this question in 2015.  
\* This option was not provided in 2015

When asked which outcome represents the best future for Syria, majorities in four of the surveyed countries (Tunisia: 73%, Egypt: 78%, Saudi Arabia: 64%, and the UAE: 54%) as well as pluralities

in Lebanon (33%) and Palestine (38%) choose “negotiations leading to a national unity government without the participation of Bashar al Assad.” For a majority of respondents in Turkey (61%) and a plurality in Iran (42%) negotiations that include Assad would lead to the best future for Syria. A plurality of respondents in Jordan (34%) lean toward “the establishment of a loose federation of regions.” And Iraqis are split on what outcome would represent the best future for Syria.

It is important to note a few changes since 2015:

- In several of the surveyed countries we find a drop in the percentages of respondents who think negotiations without Assad (e.g., UAE: -43 points, Turkey: -66 points) are the best way forward and significant jumps in the percentages of those who opt for negotiations that include Assad (e.g., UAE: +29 points, Turkey: +57 points).
- While one in five respondents in Jordan and Iraq still view partition as the best outcome, few respondents elsewhere agree.
- Between 12-16% of respondents in Lebanon, Palestine, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE think “a return to full power of the Assad government” (a new option provided in the 2018 survey) represents the best future for Syria.

## 8. IRAQ

**Table 17. Fifteen years after the US-led invasion of Iraq, who in your opinion benefited most from the war? (Choose up to two.)**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Iraqi people	6	1	9	4	9	1	26	36	27	9
US	87	87	33	53	28	35	50	37	42	44
Iran	54	26	28	15	33	50	23	19	22	15
Israel	24	60	44	30	49	26	29	22	46	41
Extremist movements	27	21	34	14	24	38	29	26	11	23
Iraqi elites	3	5	24	10	18	16	43	60	52	25
Saudi Arabia	0	0	16	6	24	27	0	0	0	25
Turkey	0	0	11	1	14	7	0	0	0	18
No one	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0

When asked who has benefited the most from the war in Iraq, overall the top choice is the United States, with respondents in Tunisia (87%), Egypt (87%), Palestine (53%), Saudi Arabia (50%), and Iran (44%) identifying the United States most frequently as a beneficiary of the war. More than one-third of respondents in Turkey, the UAE, Iraq, and Lebanon agree.

Israel is the second most frequently noted beneficiary and is the top choice among respondents in Jordan (49%) and Lebanon (44%), as well as a majority in Egypt (60%) and by more than four in 10 respondents in Turkey (46%) and Iran (41%).

**With few exceptions, respondents say that most countries have played a negative role in Iraq, with the lion's share of fault going to the US and Iran.**

According to one-half of Iraqi (50%) and Tunisian (54%) respondents, Iran has benefited the most from the war in Iraq, while for 60% of respondents in the UAE, 52% in Turkey and 43% in Saudi Arabia, Iraqi elites are the biggest beneficiaries of the war.

About one-quarter to one-third of respondents in seven of the 10 surveyed countries point to extremist movements as having benefited the most, including 38% of Iraqi respondents and 34% of Lebanese respondents as well as in Tunisia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran.

Significant percentages of respondents in the UAE (36%), Turkey (27%), and Saudi Arabia (26%) say that the Iraqi people have benefited from the war in their country, but fewer than one in 10 in the remaining surveyed countries agree. About one-quarter of respondents in Iraq (27%), Iran (25%), and Jordan (24%) view Saudi Arabia as a beneficiary of the war, while few elsewhere agree. And Turkey is least likely to be seen as having benefited from the war in Iraq.

**Table 18. Of the countries and entities listed below, which are playing a positive role in Iraq? A negative role?**

	TUNISIA			EGYPT			LEBANON			PALESTINE			JORDAN		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
Iran	5	91	-86	1	97	-96	20	48	-28	7	29	-22	11	40	-29
US	27	59	-32	3	93	-90	9	63	-54	9	62	-53	16	34	-18
Turkey	66	19	+47	54	28	+26	44	27	+17	19	10	+9	35	21	+14
Saudi Arabia	10	83	-73	55	29	+26	34	37	-3	12	16	-4	30	23	+7
Russia	14	76	-62	11	78	-67	15	50	-35	7	25	-18	25	37	-12
Iraqi military	30	49	-19	20	57	-37	34	32	+2	25	13	+12	26	27	-1
PMU*	20	64	-44	47	31	+16	26	43	-17	17	19	-2	15	37	-22
None of them	11	2	+9	11	0	+11	8	0	+8	35	11	+24	13	0	+13

	IRAQ			KSA			UAE			TURKEY			IRAN		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
Iran	42	42	0	13	82	-69	14	80	-66	27	58	-31	56	11	+45
US	0	86	-86	24	67	-43	54	34	+20	10	84	-74	0	83	-83
Turkey	34	34	0	30	62	-32	32	57	-25	72	18	+54	29	26	+3
Saudi Arabia	20	37	-17	70	17	+53	89	6	+83	25	67	-42	24	33	-9
Russia	22	29	-7	21	55	-34	22	68	-46	56	28	+28	27	23	+4
Iraqi military	28	25	+3	48	35	+13	54	34	+20	38	49	-11	34	25	+9
PMU*	33	26	+7	21	68	-47	0	95	-95	20	72	-52	37	19	+18
None of them	5	0	+5	6	0	+6	2	0	+2	4	0	+4	12	0	+12

\* Popular Mobilization Units

Overall, when asked to consider whether Iran, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the Iraqi military, and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) are playing either positive or negative roles in Iraq, Turkey is the country or entity most likely to be viewed as playing a positive role in Iraq, with majorities in Turkey itself (72%), Tunisia (66%), and Egypt (54%) as well as significant percentages in Lebanon (44%) and Jordan (35%) saying its role is positive. Majorities in Saudi Arabia (62%) and the UAE (57%) hold the opposite view of Turkey with respect to its role in Iraq.

On the other hand, **the United States is overwhelmingly seen as the most negative player in the country.** More than eight in 10 respondents in Egypt (93%), Iraq itself (86%), Turkey (84%), and Iran (83%), as well as majorities in Saudi Arabia (67%), Lebanon (63%), Palestine (62%), and Tunisia (59%) view the U.S. role as negative; one-third of those in Jordan also say the United States' role is negative (18 points more than who say it plays a positive role). Only in the UAE do respondents view the U.S. role as positive (54% vs. 34% who say it is negative).

**Iran is also widely considered to play a negative role,** by more than eight in 10 respondents in Egypt (97%), Tunisia (91%), Saudi Arabia (82%), and the UAE (80%), as well as 58% in Turkey, 48% in

Lebanon, and 40% in Jordan. Iraqis themselves are split on Iran’s role with 42% saying it is positive and 42% saying it is negative.

On balance, respondents in eight of the 10 surveyed countries find Russia’s role more negative than positive, including majorities in Egypt (78%), Tunisia (76%), the UAE (68%), Saudi Arabia (55%), and Lebanon (50%). On the other hand, a majority of respondents in Turkey (56%) say Russia is playing a positive role in Iraq.

Majorities in the UAE (95%), Turkey (72%), Saudi Arabia (68%), and Tunisia (64%) say the PMU play a negative role in Iraq, as do more than one-third of those in Lebanon (43%) and Jordan (37%). On the other hand, respondents in Egypt, Iran, and Iraq are more likely to say the PMU’s role is positive rather than negative.

Opinion is quite divided overall with respect to the roles played by the Iraqi military and Saudi Arabia in Iraq. Respondents in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Iran are more likely to view the role of the Iraqi military as positive than negative, while those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey are more likely to view it as negative than positive. For Iraqis themselves, as well as among respondents in Lebanon and Jordan, opinion on the role of the Iraqi military is evenly split between positive and negative. With respect to the role played by Saudi Arabia in Iraq, majorities of respondents in the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia itself view the Saudi role as positive, while strong majorities in Tunisia and Turkey hold the opposite view. Iraqis also are more likely to view the Saudi role as negative (37%) rather than positive (20%).

Again, we find deep sectarian divides among respondents in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE regarding their perceptions of which countries play positive and negative roles in Iraq, particularly the major players – the United States and Iran.

**Table 19. Of the countries and entities listed below, which are playing a positive role in Iraq? A negative role?**

	IRAQ						KSA						UAE					
	Sunni			Shia			Sunni			Shia			Sunni			Shia		
	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET	+	-	NET
Iran	6	80	<b>-74</b>	61	23	<b>+38</b>	1	92	<b>-91</b>	77	23	<b>+54</b>	9	85	<b>-76</b>	56	40	<b>+16</b>
US	0	100	<b>-100</b>	0	78	<b>-78</b>	16	74	<b>-58</b>	68	32	<b>+36</b>	53	35	<b>+18</b>	62	27	<b>+35</b>
Turkey	63	9	<b>+54</b>	18	47	<b>-29</b>	32	59	<b>-27</b>	18	76	<b>-58</b>	30	58	<b>-28</b>	44	44	<b>0</b>
Russia	21	29	<b>-8</b>	22	29	<b>-7</b>	16	58	<b>-42</b>	50	38	<b>+12</b>	21	69	<b>-48</b>	33	62	<b>-29</b>

In Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, Shia respondents are far more likely to view Iran’s role in Iraq as positive, while Sunni respondents are far more likely to view it as negative. It is worth noting, however, that one-quarter of Shia respondents in Iraq and Saudi Arabia and 40% of Shia in the UAE actually view Iran negatively in terms of its role in Iraq. The United States is viewed negatively by all respondents in Iraq, but somewhat positively by Shia respondents in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Russia appears to be viewed as a non-factor by Iraqi respondents, while the ratings for Russia by Saudi and Emirati respondents may reflect overall favorability rather than anything specific to the country’s role in Iraq.


**Table 20. What is the best outcome for Iraq?**

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY		IRAN	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
Iraqi government in Baghdad should be reformed to represent all Iraqis and pursue national reconciliation to unify the country		71	75	78	50	40	36	41	38	39	44	55	76	47	74	30	43	65	42	41
National unity can be maintained if Iraq is a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the Baghdad government		15	17	22	28	26	33	35	41	30	49	27	12	16	20	15	35	20	41	38
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible		14	9	0	22	34	30	24	21	31	7	18	12	38	6	55	23	15	17	22

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Tunisia was not included in the 2017 survey.

Majorities in four of the surveyed countries (Egypt: 78%, Tunisia: 71%, Turkey: 65%, Iraq: 55%) and pluralities in five others (Saudi Arabia: 47%, Palestine: 41%, Iran: 41%, Lebanon: 40%, Jordan: 39%) continue to believe that the best outcome for Iraq would be for the Iraqi government in Baghdad to “be reformed to represent all Iraqis and pursue national reconciliation to unify the country.”

In the UAE a majority, however, hold the view that “it is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible.” In Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia about one-third or more of respondents agree that Iraqi national unity is not possible.



● Reform Iraqi government ● Federation of autonomous regions ● National unity not possible

About one-quarter to one-third of respondents in five countries (Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran) think that “national unity can be maintained if Iraq is a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the Baghdad government.”

Comparing these results to last year’s results, we find growing optimism in Turkey where the percentage of those who view the best outcome as a reformed government that represents all Iraqis and seeks national reconciliation has increased by 22 points, while the percentage of those who think national unity is not possible has declined by 8 points. However, there is a growing pessimism with declines in those who believe the best outcome is a reformed representative government seeking national reconciliation in the UAE (-44), Saudi Arabia (-29), and Lebanon (-10), with corresponding increases in those who say unity is not possible (UAE: +49, Saudi Arabia: +24, Lebanon: +12).

In Iraq itself we find significant shifts. In 2017, almost one-half of respondents (49%) said the best outcome for Iraq would be a federation of autonomous regions. In the current survey this number has dropped 22 points, while the numbers of those who believe a reformed representative government is the best outcome and those who do not believe unity is possible have both increased by 11 points.

**Table 21. What is the best outcome for Iraq? (2018)**

	IRAQ					
	Sunni	Shia	Arab	Kurd	Right track	Wrong track
Iraqi government in Baghdad should be reformed to represent all Iraqis and pursue national reconciliation to unify the country	34	66	55	55	70	50
National unity can be maintained if Iraq is a federation of autonomous regions with less authority for the Baghdad government	49	15	27	24	13	31
It is best to recognize that national unity in Iraq is not possible	18	18	17	21	18	19

Arab and Kurd opinions on the future of Iraq are close to identical – with majorities of both groups viewing a reformed unified government as the best path forward. Iraqi Shia are almost twice as likely

**In most countries a majority of respondents are opposed to Arab states partnering with Israel to combat extremism and Iran’s interference.**

as their Sunni compatriots to view this unified approach as the best future for their country (66% vs. 34%), while Iraqi Sunni are three times as likely as their Shia compatriots to favor a federation of autonomous regions (49% vs. 15%). It is worth noting that this split between Sunni and Shia is also evident in the differences between those who think the country is on the right track (who are more likely to be Shia) and those who say Iraq is on the wrong track (who are more likely to be Sunni).



## 9. PALESTINE

**Table 22. It has been suggested that a partnership between Israel and Arab governments would be useful in fighting extremist groups and combating Iran’s regional interference. Which of the following best describes your opinion?**

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
Such a partnership would be desirable but only if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative		11	59	40	40	38	35	29	51	36	48	37	48	42
Such a partnership should not be pursued even if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative		84	34	55	43	47	52	52	43	42	50	60	50	58
Such a partnership would be desirable and should be pursued whether or not Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative		5	7	5	16	15	13	19	6	22	2	2	1	0

Percentages may not add to 100% because of rounding. Tunisia was not included in the 2017 survey.

Of the seven countries polled regarding their opinion on pursuing a partnership between Israel and Arab governments for fighting extremist groups and combating Iran’s regional interference, majorities in four and pluralities in the remaining three agree that “such a partnership should not be pursued even if Israel were to end its occupation of Palestinians lands and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative.” This opinion is strongest in Tunisia (84%), followed by Saudi Arabia (60%), the UAE (58%), Egypt (55%), and Jordan (52%). More than one-third of respondents in the UAE (42%), Egypt (40%), Lebanon (38%), Saudi Arabia (37%), and Iraq (36%) think that should Israel end the occupation and fulfill the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative (API), such a partnership would be desirable. About two in 10 respondents in Lebanon (15%), Jordan (19%), and Iraq (22%) think such a partnership should be pursued regardless of Israel’s actions on the occupation and the API.

**Fully one half of all Palestinians feel no solution is possible.**

In comparing this year’s survey to last year’s results, while the overall shape of the results is similar, we find a slight hardening of attitudes in some countries, with increases in the percentages of respondents who say that a partnership between Israel and the Arab governments should not be pursued no matter what in Egypt (+21), Saudi Arabia (+10), and the UAE (+8). On the other hand, there is a slight shift in Jordan and Iraq in the other direction, with increases in the percentages of respondents who say such a partnership is desirable regardless of Israeli actions (up 6 and 16 points, respectively).

**Table 23. In 2002 the Arab League unanimously endorsed the Arab Peace Initiative in which they agreed to establish normalized ties with Israel if Israel were to withdraw from the occupied territories and resolve the issue of the Palestinian refugees. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?**

	PALESTINE	
	2017	2018
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, and more effort should be made to achieve this goal.	41	37
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel is willing to return all of the territories occupied in the 1967 war including East Jerusalem and solve the issue of the refugees, but I don't believe that the Israelis will give up the territories.	27	31
Even if the Israelis agree to return all of the territories and agree to resolve the refugee issue, I am not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel.	32	32

When asked about their opinions on the Arab Peace Initiative and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Palestinians remain quite divided, with two-thirds agreeing to the API evenly divided between those who think more effort should be made to achieve peace (37%) and those who want peace but don't think the Israelis will give up territory to achieve it (31%). The remaining third (32%) say they are "not ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel." These numbers closely track those in last year's survey.

**Table 24. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which of the following options would you be more inclined to support?**

	PALESTINE	
	2017	2018
That the Palestinians have an independent state as part of a two-state solution	21	25
That there be a one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis	38	25
I don't believe a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis is possible	41	<b>50</b>

Fully one-half of Palestinian respondents now "don't believe a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis is possible." The other half are evenly split on whether they would be inclined to support a two-state (25%) or one-state (25%) solution. These results represent an increase in pessimism since last year with an increase of 9 points in those who do not think a settlement is possible.

## 10. YEMEN

**Table 25. What is your most important concern when you think of the continuing conflict in Yemen?**

	TUNISIA		EGYPT		LEBANON		PALESTINE		JORDAN		IRAQ		KSA		UAE		TURKEY	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
The presence of al Qaeda		2	22	23	29	24	17	16	23	22	27	23	44	22	21	21	35	39
The restoration of the legitimate government		3	14	3	25	26	31	23	27	24	21	29	10	14	29	21	15	10
The threat of Iranian interference		7	35	31	21	13	32	30	36	19	29	19	35	25	41	15	23	0
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen		<b>88</b>	29	<b>44</b>	25	<b>37</b>	21	<b>32</b>	15	<b>36</b>	23	<b>30</b>	10	<b>39</b>	9	<b>43</b>	27	<b>50</b>

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding. Tunisia was not included in the 2017 survey.

**In all nine countries surveyed about the continuing conflict in Yemen, at least a plurality think the most important concern is the humanitarian crisis.** This view is strongest in Tunisia (88%), followed by Turkey (50%). The presence of al Qaeda is the second most frequently cited concern overall, with more than two in 10 respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE and 39% of respondents in Turkey saying it is their most important concern. The restoration of the legitimate government and the threat of Iranian interference are also significant concerns in some countries, with more than one-quarter of respondents in Lebanon (26%) and Iraq (29%) choosing restoration of the legitimate government and more than one-quarter of those in Egypt (31%), Palestine (30%), and Saudi Arabia (25%) expressing concern about Iran’s interference in Yemen.

**In every country, a plurality of respondents say that their most important concern with the conflict in Yemen is the humanitarian crisis.**

**This year’s results are markedly different than last year’s responses.** In 2017 pluralities in five of the eight surveyed countries, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and the UAE, were most concerned with the threat of Iranian interference, while in the remaining three, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Lebanon, pluralities were most concerned about the presence of al Qaeda. The humanitarian crisis, though of concern to about one-quarter of respondents in four of the eight countries, was still the least cited concern overall in the 2017 results.

**Table 26. What, in your opinion, is the best solution to end the conflict in Yemen?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
The restoration of the legitimate government	22	30	<b>47</b>	33	<b>47</b>	38	36	<b>54</b>	<b>61</b>
Negotiations leading to compromise among the warring parties and the establishment of a central government representing all factions in the country	<b>75</b>	<b>68</b>	36	<b>58</b>	32	<b>47</b>	<b>63</b>	46	39
The partition of the country	3	2	17	9	22	15	1	0	0
Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.									

Majorities in Tunisia (75%), Egypt (68%), Saudi Arabia (63%), and Palestine (58%), as well as a plurality in Iraq (47%), think the best solution to end the conflict in Yemen is “negotiations leading to compromise among the warring parties and the establishment of a central government representing all factions in the country.” On the other hand, majorities in Turkey (61%) and the UAE (54%) and pluralities in Lebanon (47%) and Jordan (47%) think the best solution would be “the restoration of the legitimate government.” The least preferred solution overall is “partition of the country,” though significant percentages of respondents in Jordan (22%), Lebanon (17%), and Iraq (15%) favor this option.

## 11A. IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

**Table 27. How supportive were you of the nuclear agreement concluded between the P5+1 and Iran?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN
Supported	54	54	47	50	56	55	55	54	61	56
Opposed	46	46	53	50	44	45	45	46	39	44

Supported is the aggregation of responses of "fully supported" and "somewhat supported." Opposed is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat opposed" and "completely opposed."

Slight majorities in eight of the 10 surveyed countries say they either fully or somewhat supported the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran, with support hovering between 54% and 61%. Opinion is evenly split between support and opposition in Palestine. Respondents in Lebanon lean toward opposition, with 47% saying they supported the agreement while 53% opposed it.

**Table 28. In your opinion, how successful has that agreement been in limiting Iran's capacity to develop a nuclear program?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Successful	19	47	62	30	54	50	37	44	61
Unsuccessful	81	53	38	70	47	50	63	56	39

Successful is the aggregation of responses of "very successful" and "somewhat successful." Unsuccessful is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat unsuccessful" and "very unsuccessful."

Majorities in Tunisia (81%), Palestine (70%), Saudi Arabia (63%), the UAE (56%), and Egypt (53%) say the agreement with Iran has been somewhat or very unsuccessful in limiting Iran's capacity to develop a nuclear program. On the other hand, only majorities in Lebanon (62%), Turkey (61%), and Jordan (54%) believe that the P5+1 agreement has been successful in limiting Iran. Opinion is evenly split in Iraq on this question.

**Table 29. How supportive are you of the Trump Administration's decision to pull out of the P5+1 agreement?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Support	57	38	55	50	56	66	82	92	76
Oppose	43	62	45	50	44	34	18	8	24

Support is the aggregation of responses of "fully support" and "somewhat support." Oppose is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat oppose" and "completely oppose."

Majorities in seven of the nine countries surveyed say they support the Trump Administration's decision to pull out of the P5+1 agreement, with particularly strong support in the UAE (92%), Saudi Arabia (82%), and Turkey (76%), as well as 66% in Iraq and between 55-57% in Lebanon, Jordan, and Tunisia. Opinion is evenly split in Palestine (50% vs. 50%). A majority in Egypt (62%) say they oppose the Trump Administration's withdrawal from the P5+1 agreement.

**Table 30. Now that the United States has withdrawn from the agreement, what in your opinion should the remaining P4+1 countries do?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Continue to enforce the Iran deal agreement to limit Iran's nuclear ambitions	21	27	28	18	24	32	15	12	26
Completely scrap the Iran deal and impose tough sanctions on Iran in response to its meddlesome role in the region's conflicts	61	23	21	31	30	16	31	37	1
Press Iran to participate in a regional security framework to help bring peace to the region	6	34	29	27	24	30	20	11	35
Work more closely with and provide more assistance to the Arab Bloc to assist their efforts to contain Iran	12	16	22	23	22	22	33	40	38

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Attitudes on what the remaining P4+1 countries should do now that the United States has withdrawn from the agreement are quite mixed. Only in Tunisia does a majority view exist; 61% of Tunisian respondents say they should “completely scrap the Iran deal and impose tough sanctions on Iran in response to its meddlesome role in the region’s conflicts.” Elsewhere, opinions are very divided.

**In every country, other than Egypt, majorities are supportive of the Trump Administration’s decision to pull out of the nuclear deal with Iran.**

In Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq, about six in 10 respondents are divided between “continuing to enforce the Iran deal” (Egypt: 27%, Lebanon: 28%, Iraq: 32%) and “pressing Iran to participate in a regional security framework” (Egypt: 34%, Lebanon: 29%, Iraq: 30%). In Saudi Arabia and the UAE respondents are divided between “scrapping the Iran deal” (KSA: 31%, UAE: 37%) and “working to contain Iran” through the Arab Bloc (KSA: 33%, UAE:

40%). Turkish respondents are divided between working with the Arab Bloc to contain Iran (38%) and pressing Iran to participate in a regional security framework (35%). In Jordan and Palestine very slim pluralities want to scrap the Iran deal (30% and 31%, respectively) while the remaining respondents are somewhat evenly divided among the other three options.

In short, there is no consensus on the way forward.

**Table 31. Is it possible for Iran and the Arab World to live in peace?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN*
Very possible	2	10	40	12	33	24	14	8	40	49
Somewhat possible	24	20	34	53	33	60	51	50	20	44
Not possible at all	74	70	26	34	34	16	36	43	40	8

Percentages may not add up to 100% because of rounding.  
 \* In Iran, the question was: Is it possible for your country and the Arab World to live in peace?

For at least seven in 10 respondents in Tunisia (74%) and Egypt (70%) it is “not possible at all” for Iran and the Arab World to live in peace. One-third or more of respondents in the UAE (43%), Turkey (40%), Saudi Arabia (36%), Jordan (34%), and Palestine (34%) agree that peaceful co-existence is not possible.

However, for respondents in seven surveyed countries, it is possible for Iran and the Arab World to live in peace. For majorities in Iraq (60%), Palestine (53%), Saudi Arabia (51%), and the UAE (50%) it is only “somewhat possible.” But four in 10 respondents in Turkey and Lebanon, as well as one-third of those in Jordan, say it is “very possible.”

On the other hand, more than nine in 10 Iranian respondents (93%) say it is possible for their country and the Arab World to live in peace, including almost one-half (49%) who say it is “very possible.” Only 8% say it is not possible.

**There is consensus on one issue: that in any new agreement there must be “a verifiable Iranian commitment to end support for and withdraw its troops and allies from conflicts in Arab countries.”**

**Table 32. If a new international agreement is to be negotiated with Iran, in addition to a verifiable end to Iran’s nuclear program, how important is it that each of the following terms be included?**

		TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY	IRAN*
A verifiable Iranian commitment to end its ballistic missile program	Important	84	93	46	60	43	47	83	81	40	41
	Not important	16	7	54	40	57	53	17	19	60	59
A verifiable Iranian commitment to end its support for and withdraw its troops and allies from conflicts in Arab countries	Important	92	94	60	58	65	51	94	100	99	47
	Not important	8	6	40	42	35	49	6	0	1	53
Iranian participation in a regional security arrangement with Arab countries to help bring peace to the region	Important	40	98	81	58	62	80	58	41	78	72
	Not important	60	2	19	42	38	20	42	59	22	28

Important is the aggregation of responses of “very important” and “somewhat important.” Not important is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat unimportant” and “not important at all.”  
 \* In Iran, the question was “If a new international agreement is to be negotiated between your country and the United States, in addition to a verifiable end to your country’s nuclear program, how supportive would you be of such an agreement including any of the following terms?”

Overall, the most important term to be included in any new international agreement with Iran is “a verifiable Iranian commitment to end its support for and withdraw its troops and allies from conflicts in Arab countries.” More than nine in 10 respondents in the UAE (100%), Turkey (99%), Saudi Arabia (94%), Egypt (94%) and Tunisia (92%) hold this view; majorities in Lebanon, Palestine,

Jordan, and Iraq agree. Less than one-half of Iranian respondents (47%), however, think this term is important for inclusion in a new international agreement.

“Iranian participation in a regional security arrangement with Arab countries to help bring peace to the region” is important to majorities in eight of the ten countries, including 98% of respondents in Egypt, 81% in Lebanon, 80% in Iraq, and 78% in Turkey, as well as about six in 10 respondents in Jordan, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia. Seventy-two percent (72%) of Iranian respondents also agree that this term is important for any new agreement. For those in the UAE and Tunisia only about four in 10 say Iran’s participation in a regional security arrangement is important, while six in 10 say this term is not important for inclusion in a new international agreement.

Finally, “a verifiable Iranian commitment to end its ballistic missile program” is considered important by majorities in five of the 10 countries, including 93% in Egypt, 84% in Tunisia, 83% in Saudi Arabia, 81% in the UAE, and 60% in Palestine. On the other hand, majorities in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey do not consider this an important term to be included in a new agreement. Iranian respondents also do not view this term as important, with 41% calling this “very” or “somewhat important” and 59% saying it is either “somewhat unimportant” or “not important at all.”



## 11B. IRANIAN VIEWS

**Table 33. In your opinion, were your country's interests served by this [P5+1 nuclear] agreement?**

	IRAN	
	2015	2018
Agree	81	57
Disagree	19	<b>43</b>

Agree is the aggregation of responses of "strongly agree" and "somewhat agree." Disagree is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat disagree" and "strongly disagree."

A majority of Iranian respondents (57%) say their country's interests were served by the P5+1 nuclear agreement, while 43% say Iran was not well-served by the agreement. This represents a significant decline in positivity since 2015 when 81% of Iranians thought the agreement served Iran's interests.

**Table 34. Was it a good or bad idea for your government to have accepted limits on its nuclear program?**

	IRAN	
	2015	2018
A good idea	32	45
A bad idea	68	<b>55</b>

When asked if it was a good or bad idea for their government to have accepted limits on its nuclear program, 45% of Iranian respondents say it was a good idea while 55% maintain that it was a bad idea. This is actually an increase in the sentiment that it was a good idea since 2015 when just one-third of Iranians (32%) thought acceptance of these limits was a good idea.

**Table 35. How do you rate your satisfaction with your government's performance in each of the following areas?**

		IRAN	
		2017	2018
Investing in improving the economy and creating employment	Satisfied	62	46
	Dissatisfied	38	54
Advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights	Satisfied	46	37
	Dissatisfied	54	63
Improving relations with Arab governments*	Satisfied		51
	Dissatisfied		49
Improving relations with the United States and the West*	Satisfied		43
	Dissatisfied		57
Giving greater support to our allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen	Satisfied	60	51
	Dissatisfied	40	49

Satisfied is the aggregation of responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied." Dissatisfied is the aggregation of responses of "somewhat dissatisfied" and "very dissatisfied."

\* Did not ask in 2017.

## A substantial 84% of Iranians still hold the view that their country should have the right to a nuclear weapon.

Satisfaction in their government’s performance has declined for Iranian respondents by about 10 points in each area about which we asked in both 2017 and 2018. The lowest satisfaction rating goes to “advancing democracy and protecting personal and civil rights,” with only 37% of respondents saying they are satisfied with their government in this area, down 9 points from 2017. The biggest drop is found with respect to “investing in improving the economy and creating employment” – from 62% in 2017 to 46% in 2018. And

just one-half of respondents (51%) express satisfaction with the support given by their government to allies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, down from 60% in last year’s survey.

About one-half of Iranians surveyed this year (51%) are also satisfied with their government’s performance with respect to “improving relations with Arab governments,” while 43% express satisfaction with performance regarding “improving relations with the United States and the West.”

**Table 36. Which best reflects your opinion on your country having nuclear weapons?**

	IRAN
My country should have nuclear weapons because it is a major nation	41
As long as other countries have nuclear weapons, we need them also	43
Nuclear weapons are always wrong and so no country, including my own, should have them	16


A substantial 84% of Iranians believe that their country should have nuclear weapons, half (41%) because Iran is a “major nation” and half (43%) because “as long as other countries have nuclear weapons” they should too. Just 16% express the view that “nuclear weapons are always wrong” and no country should have them.

**Table 37. How important is it for your government to continue to be involved in each of the following countries?**

		IRAN				
		2014*	2015	2016	2017	2018
Syria	Important	90	73	24	69	54
	Not important	7	27	76	31	46
Lebanon	Important	88	72-	43	67	64
	Not important	10	28	57	33	36
Iraq	Important	87	64	47	75	65
	Not important	10	36	53	25	35
Yemen	Important	62	43	39	58	54
	Not important	36	57	61	42	46

Important is the aggregation of responses of “very important” and “somewhat important.” Not important is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat unimportant” and “not important at all.”

\* In 2014, percentages may not add up to 100% because responses of “not sure” are not included. This option was not provided in other survey years.



Since last year’s survey, we find declines across the board with respect to the importance that Iranian respondents ascribe to their government’s involvement in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. The most significant declines are related to the importance of Iran’s involvement in Syria (-15 from 69% in 2017 to 54% in 2018) and Iraq (-10 from 75% in 2017 to 65% in 2018). The importance of being involved in Lebanon is noted by 64% of respondents this year, while 54% say continuing to be involved in Yemen is important. Looking back over the data collected on these issues since 2014, we find steep declines from 2014 to 2016 and then a sharp increase in support for Iran’s involvement in all of these countries in 2017. This year’s decline in support for Iran’s involvement in all four countries is, therefore, noteworthy.

**A decline in Iranians’ views of the importance of their government’s continued involvement in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.**

## 12. EXTREMISM

**Table 38. Do you think it is possible for radicalized individuals to be successfully de-radicalized?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Possible	22	61	53	39	61	54	83	100	70
Not possible	78	39	47	61	39	47	17	0	30

Possible is the aggregation of responses of “very possible” and “somewhat possible.” Not possible is the aggregation of responses of “not very possible” and “not possible at all.”

Majorities in seven of the nine surveyed countries say they think “it is possible for radicalized individuals to be successfully de-radicalized,” including 100% of respondents in the UAE, 83% in Saudi Arabia, 70% in Turkey, and slimmer majorities in Egypt (61%), Jordan (61%), Iraq (54%), and Lebanon (53%). **Only in Tunisia and Palestine do majorities say that de-radicalization is not possible (78% and 61%, respectively).**

**Table 39. To what extent do you agree that your country is equipped to deal with the return of citizens who have been radicalized and fought and/or contributed to the wars in Iraq and Syria?**

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	PALESTINE	JORDAN	IRAQ	KSA	UAE	TURKEY
Agree	28	47	54	45	51	57	57	56	54
Disagree	72	53	46	55	49	42	43	44	46

Agree is the aggregation of responses of “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree.” Disagree is the aggregation of responses of “somewhat disagree” and “strongly disagree.”

When asked if their countries are equipped to deal with the return of citizens who have been radicalized and fought and/or contributed to the wars in Iraq and Syria, opinion is split in most countries. Slim majorities in Saudi Arabia (57%), Iraq (57%), the UAE (56%), Lebanon (54%), and Turkey (54%) say their countries are equipped for such returns. In Jordan, opinion is almost evenly split (51% vs. 49%). In Egypt and Palestine, slim majorities do not agree that their countries are equipped to deal with returning radicalized citizens (47% vs. 53% and 45% vs. 55%, respectively). Finally, in Tunisia a substantial 72% say their country is not ready to deal with citizens who have fought or contributed to the wars in Iraq and Syria to return to Tunisia, while just 28% say they are equipped for this challenge.

## METHODOLOGY

The approach used for conducting the poll involved face-to-face personal interviews. Urban as well as rural centres were covered in each country to cover a widespread geography. The sample obtained was nationally representative and was comprised of adult males and females who were 15+ years of age; in Palestine, adults ages 18 and up were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, only citizens were included. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where door to door sampling is not possible, a referral sampling approach was used. However, adequate measures were taken to ensure that the sample was not skewed and was broadly representative. Since random, door to door sampling is possible in the remaining countries, a multi-stage sampling methodology was employed for selection of respondents in each country.

COUNTRY	SAMPLE SIZE	MARGIN OF ERROR	DATES OF SURVEY	COVERAGE
Lebanon	629	±3.9	8/30–9/13/18	Beirut (East & West Beirut), Baabda, El Maten, Tripoli, Akkar, Baalbek, Saayda
Jordan	523	±4.3	8/30–9/11/18	Amman City, Balqa, Madaba, Irbid, Jarash, Zarqa, Mafraq, Aqaba
Iraq	1035	±3.0	8/29–9/17/18	Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Basra, Tikrit, Kirkuk, Mosul, Al Hilla, Karbala, Nassiriyah, Sulaymaniyah, Arbil, As Samawah, Fallujah
Turkey	1040	±3.0	8/29–9/15/18	Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, Gaziantep, Konya, Antalya, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Kayseri, Haymana, Ceyhan
KSA	1042	±3.0	8/28–9/13/18	Riyadh, Buraydah, Dirap, Dereya, Nazeem, Ammaryah, Onayzah, Khabrah, Jeddah, Shammasyah, Taif, Makkah, Shoa'aybah, Dammam, Al Khobar, Dhahran, Jubail, Hufuf
UAE	425	±4.8	8/30–9/11/18	Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah
Egypt	1036	±3.0	8/28–9/13/18	Cairo, Giza, Shoubra Al Khima, Alexandria, Mansura (urban & rural), Menia (urban & rural), Asyut (urban & rural), Tanta (urban & rural)
Iran	1036	±3.0	8/29–9/16/18	Teheran, Rasht, Esfahan, Yazd, Shiraz, Kerman, Mashhad, Tabriz, Ahwaz
Tunisia	841	±3.4	8/30–9/13/18	Tunis, Bizerte, Ariane, Carthage, Sidi Thabet, Megrine, Sousse, Sfax, Kairouan, Gaafsa, Belkhir
Palestine	1021	±3.1	8/22–9/12/18	Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Hebron, Jericho, Tulkarem, Tubas, Qalqilia, Salfit, Gaza City, North Gaza, Deir Al-Balah, Khan Yunis, Rafah

## Demographics

	TUNISIA	EGYPT	LEBANON	JORDAN	PALESTINE	KSA	UAE	IRAQ	TURKEY	IRAN
Male	49	51	50	53	54	51	51	50	50	51
Female	51	49	50	47	46	49	49	50	50	49
Under 30	29	42	32	44	48	47	56	44	32	32
30+	71	58	68	56	52	53	44	56	68	68
In city	64	59	89	79	71	83	87	66	73	78
Out of city	36	41	11	21	20 (village); 9 (refugee camp)	17	13	34	27	22
Sunni	99	89	27	97		85	89	34	85	6
Shia	1	2	28	2		15	11	66	15	94
Other religion		9 (Christian)	38 (Christian); 7 (Druze)	2 (Christian)	98 (Muslim); 2 (Christian)					
Ethnicity								17 (Kurd); 75 (Arab); 7 (other)		





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